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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
FED~~RAL F~-\R"Jl 1l0RT-
(L\U~: CORPOR..-\TlO~, a 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Re:::pondent, 
vs. 
YANCE D. \YALKER, a~ 
.\rlmini~trator of the Estate 
of GEIL\LD C. \VALKER, 
Deceased~ L E 0 N A W. 
CORBITT: ELVEN WAL-
KER: LUELLA W. ROB-
KELLEY: MAX WAL-
K~~R: HARRY WALKER, 
by his Guardian ad litem 
YANCE D. WALKER, 
};,lRST DOE: S E C 0 N D 
DOE: THIRD DOE: AND 
FOURTH DOE, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Respondent's 
Brief 
Cai"e No. 7211 
# ARGUl\fENT 
ThP /Jist rict Cottrt Had Jurisdiction To Foreclose 
Res poud en t 's J nd [Jrl JJ/e nt Lien. 
Tile first t·ontention utade and argued h~' appellants 
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rs that a court of e4.uit~T is without ju~sdiction to fort•-
close a money judgnwnt lien against the Pstate of a 
deceased ;judgment debtor. ln proceeding under Sec-
tion 102-9-11 Lr.C.A. 1943*, respondent expressl~T waived 
recourse against any other propert.v of the estate. 
Although the section provides that ''an action ma~· be 
brought without notice h)- an)- holder of a mortgage 
or lien" without presentation of a daim, appellant~ 
believe this section is lirnited by 102-9-10, which provides 
that "J udg1nent against the decedent for the recovery 
of money must be presented to the executor or adminis-
tr·ator like any other claim". They therefore contend 
that a money judgment lien holder is limited to the 
probate court for collection. Since both of the fiections 
provide for the presentation of clain1s to the personal 
rep\sentatiYe, instead of 102-9-16 being a limitation 
" on the other, tl1e latter is an exception to the rule of 
the two sections. Furthermore, the pertinent portion 
of 102-9-16 makes reference to judgments for the 
recovery of rnon'~y onl~· and not to judgment liens, 
I 
while the other section has reference to liens which, 
unquestionahly, would inelude judgment liens. \rP 
find no Ftah case in point and appellants cite none. 
rPhe cases quoted from by appellants on pages 15 to 
20 inclusive, are not in point. In the Bletcl1er case the 
plaintiff had no lien. In the Nielsen t•ase a chattel 
m0rtgage lien harl expired for failnn~ to n·new. In 
*-All citations of statutes through hrief will be Utah Annotated. 1943 
_ unless otherwise indicated. 
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the Gautier ea~e (Okla.) the statute under considera-
tion wa~ siruilar to 10-l-31-1 and the case pertained only 
to the situation~ under whieh execution rnay issue. 
~-\ pparently Oklahoma has no statute si1nilar to 102-9-11. 
For this ren~on the Fluke case (Okla.) is also no auth-
ority. T~e /{ ~gyin ea::;e (Fla.) also pertains to executio11s 
and apparently Florida does not have a statute similar 
to 102-9-11. The JJ ead case (Calif.) pertained to a con-
tingent clann and no lien was involved. In the Delfelder· 
cat-'e C\\~yo.) prmuissor~· notes were the basis of the 
claim. In the Flynn case (Idaho) the clairn is for recov-
ery of dmuages and breach of contract. 
However, 102-9-11 is identical with California Pro-
hate Code Section 716 and 102-9-16 is identical with 
California Probate Code Section 732. It is quite obvious 
that the r tah Statutes were patterned after the Cali-
fornia Statutes and, it seems inevitable that the con-
struction placed thereon by the Supreme Court of 
California will be persuasive upon this Court. In Cor-
pnrntion of America vs. Marks, 73 P. 2d 1215, the 
Supreme Court of California made a very clear and 
well-reasoned statement on the precise question, saying: 
''Defendants contend that enforcernent of 
the judgment lien in the course of the adminis-
tration proceeding is the exclusive remedy of 
the jndg-lll(-mt lien ereditor upon the death of 
tl1e debtor prior to lev:· of execution. If a 
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judg~ment lien is enforceable only through the 
probate proeeeding, and upon the filing of a claim 
in that proceeding, it alone is singled out from 
all other liens. Other lien~, by virtue of the 
provision~ of Section 716, Probate Code, ma~· 
be enforced again~t the property subject to the 
lien, waiving recourse against other property, 
notwithstanding the time for filing a claim there· 
on ha~ expired and the estate has been closed. 
Dre.d'uss v. Giles, supra; Uerman Sav. & L. Soc. 
v. Fisher, supra; Visalia Bank v. Curtis, supra. 
The heirs and distributPes take subject to such 
liens. We can pen·eive of no reason why the 
Legislature should wish to single out judgment 
liens for separate, less favorable treatment. 'A 
judgment lien has always been regarded as the 
highest form of securit~r.' l\lorton v. Adams. 
124 Cal. 229, 231, 56 P. 1038, 1039, 71 Am. St. 
Rep. 53. It is a matter of publie record. 
"We are of the view that section 716, Pro-
bate Code, applies to judgmentliens, and rec-
ognizes a right in the judgment lien creditor to 
bring an equitable action to foreclose his lien on 
the death of the judgment debtor. The lang-
uage of said seetion is broad. It applies to 
':ivfortgages or liens.' .As in the cast> of a mort-
gage lien, such an action ma~· lH· brought during 
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5 
the cour:sP of the adinini8tration prm·et>ding or 
after the P:state has been distributed against 
those \Yho haYe ~uc.ceeded to the property subject 
to the lien; recoun~e against other property being 
waived. ~el'tion 7:-t2, Probate Code, ter1ninates 
the right to leY:' execution upon property subject 
to the lien, but we find nothing in said section 
excluding enforceu1ent of a judg1nent lien 
through an equitable action brought to foreclose 
it, which right is recognized as to mortgages and 
other lien~ generally h:, section 716. There is 
a difft>renee between an execution levy and sale 
hy the ~heriff without prior court order, and a 
foreclosure sale held pursuant to order of the 
<·ourt iW an equitable action for foreclosure. 
'' T n thiH analysis, the requirement of section 
7:32, Probate Code~ that 'a judgntent against the 
deeedent for the recovery of rnoney must be filed 
or presented in the same rnanner as other claims', 
means that if the judgment lien creditor would 
obtain paYJ.nent of his judgrnent through the 
admini~tration proceeding, with a right to a 
deficienc:· in tlw event the property subject to 
the l iPn is insufficient to pay hi1n in full, he must 
l'ilP a elain1 notwitlu..;tanding his debt has already 
lH·<·n redw·<·<l to judgnwnt. This is the rule 
wl1id1 appliP~ to mortgages and other liens." 
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Appellants alt::lo t::ltate that it seeu1s to them that 
102-9-11 applies only to tho~e liens which are specifi-
cally waived by the judgn1ent debtor or are exempt 
frmn the provisions of 38-0-1. rrhere is no basis for 
reading into 102-9-11 either of the two limitations. 
However, appellants exvress the fear that without so 
liiniting the section, probate homesteads in 101-4-6 would 
be defeated and the court would be unable to discharge 
the preferences established under 102-9-22, particularly 
liens upon the property set apart as a homestead. Appel-
lants' fears are unfounded. An equitable action on 
a judgrnent lien ''upon the real property occupied, sel-
ected or set apart as a homestead" (102-9-22) would 
not prevent the personal representative from paying 
the debt any uwre than if the debt were secured by 
a rnortgage. The statute applies in exactly the same 
1nanner to judgment liens as to mortgages. 
Respondent Did Not HaL:e An Adequate Remedy At Law 
Appellants contend that in any event a court of 
equity cannot take jurisdiction because the judgment 
creditor has an adequate remedy at law h~, way of 
execution and sale under 104-37-7, which provide~. that: 
"Notwithstanding the death of a party after 
the judgment, execution may be issued or it 
1nay be enforced, as follows: ... if the judg-
nlcnt* i':-' for recovery of real or personal prop-
erty, or tile enforcement of a lien." 
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Thi~ et>rtainly doP~ not say that after the death of 
a judgment debtor tht> judgntent 1nay not be enforced 
by action. The exac.t 1neaning of the section is sOlne-
wllat obscure but it ha8 its counterpart and predecessor 
in Section 686, California Code of Civil Procedure. In 
Corporation of America l'S. Jfarks, supra, the California 
Supretne Court held that Section 732 of the Probate 
CmJP tenninate~ the judgntent creditor's right to execu-
tion leYy and ~ale upon the death of the judgment 
debtor, except where execution has been levied on the 
debtor's property prior to his death. - The issuance 
of execution provided for in 104-37-7 is effective only 
"if the judgment be for the recovery of real ... prop-
erty" or, if the judgment is for "the enforcernent of 
liens thereon". Respondent's deficiency judgment tn 
the foreclosure action was not a judgment for the 
reeovery of real property nor for the enforcement of 
a lien thereon. The judg1nent appealed from herein 
is the judg1nent for the enforcement of a lien on 
specific real property. California's related section, 686 
C. C. P., was considered in Stanley v. Westover, 269 P. 
468. The Court held, under facts very similar to the 
ca~e at bar, that execution could not legally issue ancl 
the sale was void. It was this case that persuaded 
l'espondent that tl1P si1nple 1nethod of having execution 
i~· IIPd ~hould not l>e attempted. 
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Presentation Of A Clailll Is Not A Prerequisite 
On pages 19 and 20 of their brief, appellants con-
tinue their a~ument to the effect that plaintiff failed 
to allege that it had filed a claim, and that this was 
fatal. The cases they quote from are not in point as 
those plaintiffs had no liens, as heretofore shown. 
Appellants continue to ignore the express exception in 
102-9-11 pertaining to mortgages and liens. R-espon-
dent does not contend that an un~eeured judgment may 
he the basis for an equitable adion 'lvithout presenting 
a cl~n, but stresses the fact that a judgment lien is 
the subject matter of the instant case, and that such a 
lien has the same status as a mortgage insofar as 102-
9-11 is coneerned. 104-30-1;> rnakes a judgment from 
the tin1e it is docketed "a lien upon all the real property 
of the judgment debtor not exempt from execution". 
Res1Jondent 's judgment wa~ docketed in the county in 
which the .real property was located. It will be shown 
later that the property was not exempt from execution. 
The Supreme Court of Ftah recognized the excep-
tion in 102-9-11 where it said ''The material question, 
and the one decisive in this case, is whether the Eccles 
Lumber Company had a valid and subsisting lien." (In 
Re Stone's Fjstate, -16 P. 1101.) 
Section 1 02-D-+ proYides that ''nothing in this title 
contained shall he so eonstrned as to prohihit the fore-
clmmn~ of liens or mortg~1,~·ps as hereinafter provided". 
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Tt ·will he noted that 102-9-11 as wt'll a8 102-8-2, pertain-
ing to suum1ary a(huini~tration and distribution of 
~mall p:-;tates. is .. in this title contained". 
For Tl1e Pitrpu:it:s of Re;)jJUildent 's Action Its Judgment 
Lien Did Sot E.rpi re At End of Eight Years. 
Appellants next l'ontend that the lien of the judg-
ment expired and ceased to be a JJWn on the 28th day of 
:--;epten1her, 1946. The, basi8 for this is 104-30-15, which 
prodde8 that a judgrnent lien shall continue for eight 
year8. This, however, is not the only L'tah statute on 
the subject . 104-2-21 provides that the period in 
which an action on a judgn1ent shall cmnmence is eight 
years. 104-37-6 provides that "In all cases the judg-
ment nmy be enforced . . . after the lapse of eight 
years ... b:~ judg1nent for that purpose ... ". Re-
spondent filed its action within the eight-year period, 
and filed for record a notice of lis pendens. The action 
wa~ for the foreclosure of its judgment lien. 
Appellants rely on Smith z;. Sclw·artz, 60 P. 305. 
decided b:r this Court in 1899. It was there indicated 
that the lien period could not be extended under any 
ti n·um~tances. The particular point does not appear 
to have again been before this Court until January, 1948. 
at which thne a broader and much nwre reasonable 
construction wa~ given and it was held that there are. 
eircum~tmH'P~ where the lien may eontinue beyond the 
l·ig·l! t ~·pars. F rt:e c. FarJucurtll, 188 P. 2d 731. The 
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exception there involved was not the same as In the 
instant case. However, the basis for the rule IS the 
smne in each case, that is, the ineffectiveness of an ex-
ecution. There it was held, although the Rf·gional 
Agricultural Credit Corporation had the legal right to 
have an execution issued, that it would have been u~c·­
less to have done so. In the case at bar, respondent 
could not, at the ti1ne it was decided that something 
must be done to protect its lien, have execution issuerl 
because of the death of the judgment debtor. (102-9-16.) 
Appellants quote from decisions from other States 
to the effect that "the filing of a complaint to foreclose 
a lien in a court of equity does not extend the lien. 
(Pages 23-25, Appellants' Brief.) This does not mili-
tate against the right to con1plete the foreclosure aetion. 
However, appellants quote from a :Minnesota case and 
a South Dakota case. F~'"\hese excerpts it is indieail'd 
that the action falls if the lien expires during the pend-
ency of the action. Without knowing nwre of the con-
text, without a statement of the particular facts, and 
without knowledge of the pertinent statutes, the ex-
cer·pts are of little value. This would seem to he par-
ticularly true in the Minnesota case as the lien period 
therein mentioned expired on June 3, 1880. lt ahw 
appears frorn the excerpt that the particular action wat' 
in aid of the execution issued in connection with a clto:'P 
in action. Furthennore, in quoting the :--;tatutP, t h~ 
statement is that a judginent slmll survive for ten 
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year~. The rt'f"prenee i:3 not to a judgment lien. In the 
South Dakota ea~e, it does not appear from the mferpt 
t1 
that any action wa~ filed. The referelice is rnerely to 
·'The filing of a notice of action''. 
In any event, there i~ no showing that any of the 
other states had ~tatutes ~irnilar to the Utah statutes 
here under consideration. Furthermore, in Nelson v. 
Jorqcnsuu, :2-±:2 P. 9-±5, this Court had.under consider-
ation a ease which, afthough the opinion does not state 
whether a judgrnent lien was involved, respondent 
assumes had reference to such 'a judgment. The plaintiff 
therein had obtained a judg1uent on October 15, 1914, 
and on October 16, 1922, had instituted an action founded 
upon the 191-± judgrnent. The question was whether 
a demurrer which was sustained, ''presumably on the 
ground that it appeared frorn the face of the complaint 
that the cause of action was barred by the statute of 
limitations", had properly been sustained. This Court 
held that it had not because the last day of the eight 
years fell on Sunday and the cornplaint was filed the 
next day and, therefore, on time. If the plaintiff's 
judgment had becorne a lien, and if an action falls 
when the lien expires, it would seern to have been an 
idle act of this Court to have held as it did. According 
to appellants' contention the proper holding would hav~ 
be!:'n that, although the action was filed in time, 
there was no use considering the question because it 
lmd become 11100t clue to the fact that the lien had expirerl. 
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Tf there was no pn>pPrt~- a;2;aim;t wltieh tlw judg-
ltJPnt had beeome a lien, then no lien <·ould expire during 
the pendene~- of the action and the aetion would not 
fall. r:rhis would lead to the ridieulous ~onclusion that 
one witJt a judgment that \va:-; not a lien would be in a. 
better position than one with a judgment that was a 
lien. It would also be difficult to Pxplain why one 
whose judgment did not <·onstitute a lien would be al-
lowed to prosecute hi~ adion to judgment while the 
judgment lien ereditor would not. And would the newly-
acquired judgment of the creditor who had no previou~ 
lien attach to any real propert~- ac<tuired hy the jud~·­
ment debtor within eight years after the new judgment J? 
~\pparentl~- it would, thus again ~tre~sing the incon-
sistenc~' that would result if it were true a~ contended 
h~- appellants that the act~'1n in the instant case becamP 
a nullity on Septe1nber 28, 1946. l\roreover, 104-37-n 
would give a judgment lien creditor \vho ::;eeks to 
enforce his judg1nent after ei_rJht years rights which 
would be denied to him if he connnell(·ed his action 
within eight years. 
r:rhe Supreme Court of California had o<·<·n:-;wn m 
1!)03 to re\'iew a case where the facts wc>re quite similar 
to the case at bar. The Court 111ade the follo\\-ing Jwrti-
nent statement~. The qne~tion i~: 
''would the lien of the bank exi~t at the time 
the land was ordered sold, November 19, 1900, 
two ~-Pars and one month after tlw I i<>n atta<·herl, 
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or \Yhen ~old., :\1 a~· 4, 1901 
.. The petition to sell tlw land to Prd'o I'<'P pay-
rnent of the bank'~ dain1 and tlw lien was filed 
before the two Year~ limitation had <'Xpired. 
and lwd flu' effect to arrest it.s furfh('r oper-
ation, even if it l><' conceded that it wm; running 
again~ t the lien. " (In Re \ V iley 's Estate, 71 
P . .J.-!1.) 
\\'"P do not find that this case has been overruled. 
'rhere \Yould seen1 to be no doubt that the decision 
of the Suprente Court of California, based upon statutGs 
which are not only similar to the Utah statutes but an-
the forerunner~ thereof, is nwre indicative of the rule 
thi~ Court has followed and should follow. In fact, it 
i~ respondent's belief that this Court has already in-
dicated hy its decisions in the Jorgenson and Farnworth 
<'a~e~ that it would not construe 104-2-21 to pennit the 
filing of an action to foreclose a judgrnent at any tirne 
within eight years after the docketing of the judgment 
and at the same time hold that to be effective not only 
must the action be cornmenced withjn the eight years 
but must have proceeded to judgn1ent and sale. The 
efl'ed of thi~ would be to limit the tin1e within which an 
effective action upon a judgrnent could be instituted to 
a much shorter period than eight years. A judgment 
lien erPditor would be for<'e<l to <·oJTP<·tly deterrnine the 
tjmp that n1ight hP consmned h~· dilator~' ad~ of the 
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defendant, and through the courts, which with Nection 
75 of the Bankruptcy Ad might Yery well be more !l!(.tl7 
eight years. The effect of a u10rtgage foreclosure 
demonstrates the correct rule. A mortgage lien expires 
when the debt is barred. Nevertheless, if a foreclosure 
action is commenced before the debt is barred, the pro-
perty remains subject to sale under the foreelo~ure 
decree. There is no question but that 102-9-11, 'vhich 
provides that an action ma:- ht> brought b~- the holdrr 
of a mortgage or lien to enforce the same and which re-
fers to the complaint, conteu1plates a foreclosure action. 
By Re¢ason Of The Waiver b.lJ Gerald C. TValkc1· 
The 8·ubject Propert.lJ Was Not E.rempt 
'1-,his aetion is supplementary to respondent's fore-
closure action in which the judgrnent here sought to l:>r 
foreclosed was rendered. Both actions were instituted 
in the san1e court. In the foreclosure action copies of the 
note and mortgage signed by Gerald C. Vv alker wen· 
attached to and n1ade a part of the complaint. The 
following waiver appears in the note: 
''Each and every maker and endorser of this 
note hereby expressl~· waives the benefit of all 
exemptions, homestead rights or otherwise, un-
der the laws of this State, and agrees to pay 
same without any offset ·wl~atsot·ver " 
Tilt> 1110rtgage provides: 
''That they \Vill pay tll< .. ' i])(iebtedne::-;s l1erel'~·' 
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~t'etued in atTord<lll<.'l' with the tt'I'lllt:; of thi;-: 
uwrtgage and the provision8 of said note ... '' 
Also: ··The eovenanb and agn·ettH:'lll:..; herei11 
contained :-;hall extend to and ht>eome binding 
upon the heir~. PXecutors, administrator~, suc-
ce~~or~ and as~igll:-; of the uwrtgagor ... '' 
By reason of such \\·aiYer, neither Uerald C. \Valker 
nor any of the appellants um~' legally prevent the col-
lection of the full indebtedne;:-;~ by clairuing any exerupt-
ions hmnestead or otherwise. The lower court had before 
it the records in the foreclosure action, Exhibit C. 
Although respondent believes that this is a full 
answer to appellants' clairn that the property is exernpt 
either as a statutor~· hornestead or as a probate hornB-
~t~·<HL respondent will :-;how that the property is not 
exPmpt under any circmustances. 
Tl1e Sttuject Property Was Not EJ;en!JJl Under the Utah 
Statutes As The llo;nestead of Gerald C. Walker 
Appellants contend that the subject property wa:..; 
PX.l·mpt a:::; the homestead of Gerald l 1 • vValker and thai 
respondent's judgrnent, therefore, never becmne a lien 
on the proprty. Appllants state that Gerald C. Walker 
at the tiine of his d\ath was a resident of Srnithfie1d, 
Ctah, and the head of a farnily. rrhe lower court had 
lJt>fore it the fact that Gerald C. \Valker died on or 
lwfon_• .Ta11uar~· 1-t, 1946, at El SPgundo, California; that 
he h<ul lH'('ll living tlll'l"P at lt>ast since l~l-1~~; that the 
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subject propert~, was occupied 1>:' tenants in 1943 and 
thereafter; and had been so occupied for some time 
prior thereto. 
rrhese facts clearly refute appellants' contention in 
view of 104-37-16, which provides in part: 
• '.K one of such exemptions are for the benefit 
of non-residents or persons about to depart 
from this state with the intention of removing 
their effects therefron1 ... '' 
Since the avowed purpose of hmnestead laws is to 
exernpt the hmne in which a debtor and his family reside, 
there is no doubt but that "non-residents" as used in 
the statute means persons who do not live in the state. 
This is supported by the fact that ''persons about to 
depart from the state with the intention of removing 
their effects therefrom" are in the same category as 
"non-residents". It is to be noted that onl~, the intention 
of re1noving effects is required and not the intention 
to establish a legal d01nicile in another place. l T n< 1 ues-
tionably, Gerald C. Walker who had leased the sub,jee1 
property and had lived in California for three or more 
years irnmediately preceding his death was a non-
resident. r:rhis Court considered this statute in U. 8. 
Building and Loan Association 't:. ~liidcale Bonte Fi'n-
ance Corporation, 46 P. 2d 672. Although the Court 
expn-.~:-;:-;ly l1eld that the question was not hPI"on· it, the 
fact that hmnestead exemptions are not availabh· to non-
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resident~ "·a~ expre~:::-;ly n•eognized n~ was t hP fad 
that other important factor::-; n1ust appPar frmn the• 
pleadings or proof. 'rhe following i:::-; ctuoted frmn the 
opinion: 
''The benefits of hmnestead exentptions art• 
not available to ·non-residents or person::; about 
to depart frou1 this state "·ith the intention ot 
renwving their effeeb therefrmn'. R. S. UtaJ1 
1933, 104-37-6. A::; to smne of the unit holderi5, 
the record is silent as to \vhether they are mar-
ried or single and as to whether or not they an~ 
heads of farnilies, or if any of thern are heads 
of fmnilies the ntunber in the fmnily. The rec-
ord is likewise silent as to whether any of the 
unit holders have or have not already selected 
a homestead and if so the value thereof. Such 
being the state of the record before us, it i:-; 
ilnpossible to dispose of the unit holden;' 
claims of homesteads.'' 
102-8-1 ha~bearing on this subject. It reads in 
part as follows: ''When a person dies, leaving 
a surviving wife, husband or minor children. 
they shall be entitled to remain in possession 
of the hmnestead . . . '' 
It would follow that the minor children could not '· re-
JJiaiH in possession of the homestead'' unless the proper-
t~· was the hmnestead of the decedent and certainly not 
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unless the wife and 1ninor children were living thcre~on 
at the tin1e of the deceJ'dent '~ death. 
Th Subject P1·operty Was Not Ex:e1npt 
As A Probate HomestecLd 
If not a statutory hOinestead, appellants eontend 
then that it is a probate honwstead, and the:· rely on 
101-4-6, which provides that ''A homestead r.t5 provided 
by section 1, title Honiesteads, . . . shall be wholl.'· 
exe1npt fr01n the paYJnent of the debts of the deeedent 
... to be set apart on petition and notice, ... ". The 
first question is what hon1estead is provided by 38-0-1 
The answer is, lands not exceeding in value the sum 
of $2,000 for the head of th.e fmnily, and a further suw 
of $750 for the spouse, and $300 for each other memhPr 
of the fainily. When a widower, who has not remarried. 
dies, as in this case, who is the head of the family en-
titled to the $2,000 exemption? It can hardly be the 
decedent; We must look then to 38-0-5 to see whether 
the $2,000 exemption applies. The "head of a family" 
is defined as (1) the husband or wife, when the claimant 
is married. If "the claimant" was the decedent the 
$2,000 exeinption is not available because he was a 
widower. Furthermore, he could not have been the 
clai1nant because he was a non-resident. There was no 
spouse, so, the $750 exemption would not he allailable. 
The further definition is (2) "Every person who has 
residing with him and under his care and maintenance", 
any one or nwre of several relatives. Decedent had 
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no1w of them .. rP~iding with him", nor did thP minor, 
Harry \\~alker. It i~ subinittP(l. too, that .. residing with 
him" eonten1pla tl'~ reside nee in lT tah. lt is nc1t shown 
that Harry \Yalker r~.=·~ided in Utah and we know that 
(h'rald C. \Y alker did not. It would appear that the Inax-
immn ntlue that could have been exmnpt and set apart 
as a probate l1o1nestead would have been $300. However, 
a~ we shall shm\-, no property was ;::;et apart as a probate 
homestead. 
It would semn that the nwst reasonable construction 
of 1 01-4:~6 is that before a hmnestead of a value equal 
to the total of the $2,000 for the head of a family, $750 
for the spouse, and $300. for each other person could he 
{'Xempt, such hmnestead rnust have been selected by the 
deceJident before his death, or, in any event, mus~ have 
been property he could have legally selected. It is not 
reasonable that, when a rnan and his family nwve to 
California and are therefore not entitled to a hmnestead 
exemption, his family would be entitled to have propert~· 
in r tah set apart as a probate honlestead. 
This court has considered the question as to th8 
value that rnay be set apart as a probate homestead (In 
Ht· ~[ower's Estate, 73 P. 2d. 967). On page 973, the 
Court said: 
''The basic hmnestead, set apart for the head 
of the farnily is $2,000, and an additional al-
lowanee o 1:' $300 for each 1ninor child or other 
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dependent. If there be no mmor child or de-
pendent other than the spouse·, the homestead 
value is $2,000. If there be no surviving spou:-<:•, 
but minor children, one JJt.u~t be considered ({s 
head of the famil.LJ for hmneslead purposes in 
probate proceedings, so that the $2,000 ma:• 
be clairned and set apart as a homestead, and 
for each additional minor child a further :.;um 
of $300 would be set apart as part of the home-
stead, together with the exempt personal prop-
erty." 
Concededly, this conclusion was arrived at through a 
liberal interpretation and was n1ade possible because 
in said case there were two on more rninor children. 
Since 38-0-5 conternplates that there could not be a 
head of a family unless there were two or more persons 
involved, it follows that in the instant case with but 
the one minor, the conclusion reached in the ]1 ower case 
cannot be reached in the case at bar. In Zttniga 1:. E 1;ans, 
48 P. 2d 513, this Court held that a widower, all of whosP. 
children had attained n1ajorit~· and were not dependfnt 
upon hirn was not entitled to a homestead exemption a~ 
the head of a family. 
As a further indication as to what ''homestead a~ 
provided in section 1, title Hon1esteads '' i~ exempt under 
101--±-G, attention is called to the provision in tlw 1 'tah 
Constitution on the subject. A l'tiel<> XXT l, St>dion ~ 
provides in part that "The Legislature shall provi<lP 
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by law, for the ,-.:electioll b~· Paelt head of a famii,IJ. an 
exemption of a howP~tP:.Hi ... from :-:alP on exeeution ". 
The Legi~lature ~eem~ to have complied at least to a 
cei'tain extent. ~~~-0-ti and ;~~-0-~. whirh an· the onl~· 
~tatnte~ pertaining to selection-disn·garding 38-0-10 
for the time heing-n::-;e the \Yords ''selected'' and 
":.;Pled". However. it appear::-; that thi~ Court ha~ 
held that an actual selectiull is not necessary. 38-0-10, 
12 provides for the declaration of a hornestead and the 
recordation thereof, but further provide that a failure 
to make ~uch declaration ~hould not irnpair the horne-
stead right. It i:-: interesting to note that the Legisla· 
ture in 19-±7 redrafted 38-0-10 in such a rnanner that 
there is no longer an~· question but that the homestead 
must be selected and a declaration thereof recorded in 
order that it ::;hall be effective as an exernption. rehe 
:::;ection no\\· reads as follows : 
''The homestead must be ~elected and clainted 
by the hon1estead claimant by rnaking, signing 
and acknowledging a declaration of homestead 
as provided in Seetion 38-0-11, lTtah Code An-
notated 1943, which declaration rnust, before 
the time stated in the notice of sale on execution, 
or on other judicial sale, as the tirne of sale, of 
prernises in which the hornestead is claimed~ 
be delivered to and served upon the sheriff or 
other offiet>r eonducting the sale or recorded 
a:-: provided in Section 38-0-1:2, lTtah Code An-
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notated 1943. If no such claim is filed or served 
as herein provided, title shall pass to purchaser 
at such sale free and clear of all homestearl 
rights''. 
There is no indication that the decendent as a head 
of a family ever selected the subjed property as a 
hmnestead. Not only has Harry \V alker not selected 
the property as a homestead, but he is not the head of 
a fanlily and, therefore, is not legally entitled to select 
it. Even if he were, his selection thereof would not 
take priority over respondent's judgment lien. 104. 
37-16 reads in part as follows: 
''No article or speeies of pro pert~· mention in 
the title Hon1esteads is exernpt from execution 
issued upon a judgment recovered for ... ~ 
or upon a judgment on foreclosure of a mort-
gage or other valid lien thereon . . . ''. 
The Subject Property Was Distributed Subject To 
Respondent's Lien. 
Notwithstanding the pendency of tnis action, the 
ad1ninistrator of the. Estate of Gerald C. Walker petit-
ioned the Probate Court for summary and final dis-
tribution of the estate. On December 28, 1946, the 
subject property was distributed to Harry \Valker. 
It is submitted that the property was distributed to 
H arr~; Walker subject to respondent's lien If there 
was any intention on the part of the Legislature to st>t 
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apart e~tate::' when• the whole Yalue does not <'X<'t><·~l 
$1;,ou. free and clear of all morf!!O/JeS a11d jwl.(JJJicul 
lien:;, :::mch dra~tie interference with the rightt-~ of lit>n 
holder~ would be ~tated affirn1atiYd)· nnd would not be 
taken by 1nere mnission. In other t-~tate::s the statute~ 
pertaining to surmnar)· adntinistration are rnore explicit 
and t'how affinnatiYely that the property thus set apart 
i~ subject to valid liens Of necessity, this would seeut 
to be the law, othen,·ise there would be a taking of pro-
perty without due process of law, and at that, by mere 
implication. 
There is no doubt but that under 102-8-2 the Court 
may properly set apart a probate hmnestead subject to 
ntlid liens. However, the section does not pretend to 
create probate homesteads. 101-4-6 is the only section 
under which a probate homestead can be created or de-
signated and set apart. This section provides however 
that the probate homestead is ''to be set apart on pe-
tition and notice'·. No petition was filed by the minor 
for the purpose of having a probate hmnestead determin-
ed and set apart, no notice pertaining to a probah· 
homestead was ever given and no order was ever made 
h~· the Probate Court setting any property apart as a 
probate hmnestead. It is submitted that if propert~· 
i~ to be distributed under surnmary administration 
subject to a probate homestead, such homestead must 
have been "set apart on petition and notieP" prior to 
di~triLution. Sot having been done in the ('.clt-~P at bar, 
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HaiT~· Walker is in no position to claim that the sub. 
ject property i~ exempt as a probate homestead and 
the judg1nent of the lower ('ourt should be affirmed. 
This Court has held that existing liens on land 
cannot be defeated h~, subsequent declaration of home-
stead, Mcll:furdie v. Clrug,r;, 107 P. 2d 163. And in de-
tennining the net value of the homestead, subsisting 
liens and encumbrances are to he deducted, Crosb:tJ Ji • 
.11 nderson, 162 P. 75. 
ReszJectfully sttb/}/ittcd, 
f(IC#A-1?0 W. YOfl#t;.. 
BULLmN & BELL 
Attorney:) for Respondc1lf 
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